Senate Condemns US Air Force ECSS Program Management. Air Force Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) program. The request was made in the wake of the Air Force’s publication of the executive summary . Air Force Implements New Inspection System. With the signing of Program Action Directive 13-01, Air Force inspection system Implementation. 1994 US Air Force PROGRAM ACTION DIRECTIVES. Directives and Guidance. Grant Program; FAQs; Contact; General. You can find contact information on our Air Force Installation Voter Assistance Office Contact. ![]() Guard and Air Force Reserves directives. No Air Force program or recipient of federal. Directives Page: Complete listing of all United States Air Force directives and instructions. United States Air Force Flight Management Program. Air Force Forces or Air Force Commander? Commander, Air Force Forces. 12 Neither the program action directive nor Air Force doctrine offers. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 1-2. Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard). Have a propensity for action. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE. This Air Force Instruction. PROGRAM ACTION DIRECTIVES (PAD). This revision incorporates a Program Guidance Letter. Air Force form afi10-501 Keywords: U.S. You may recall that Levin and Mc. Cain christened the billion- dollar program failure—which the Air Force admitted failed to produce any significant military capability after almost eight years in development—as being “one of the most egregious examples of mismanagement in recent memory.” Given the number of massive Do. D IT failures to choose from, that is saying something. Whereas the Air Force report listed four contributing factors for the ECSS program’s demise (poor program governance; inappropriate program management tactics, techniques, and procedures; difficulties in creating organizational change; and excessive personnel and organizational churn), the Senate staff report condensed them into three contributing factors. Cultural resistance to change within the Air Force. Lack of leadership to implement needed changes; and. Inadequate mitigation of identified risks at the outset of the procurement. In large part, the report blamed the calamity on the Air Force’s failure to adhere to business process reengineering guidelines “mandated by several legislative and internal DOD directives and . Nevertheless, the risk mitigation approaches the service ended up developing were “woefully inadequate.” In fact, the report said that the Air Force identified cultural resistance as an ongoing risk issue throughout the program. However, the lack of action to address it permitted the “potential problem” to become an acute problem. Two key risk reduction aspects of the plan were to “forego any modifications” to the Oracle software selected for ECSS and to “conduct significant testing and evaluation” of the system. One was partially a problem of the Air Force conducting what can only be called bait- and- switch procurement. As the report states. Confusion about the software suite plagued ECSS, contributing significantly to program delays. Not only was time and effort dedicated to integrating the three separate software components into a single integrated solution, but there were disagreements about who was responsible for that integration. Among the root causes of the integration- related delay was the Air Force’s failure to clearly understand and communicate program requirements. The report states. The Air Force has, on different occasions, used wildly different estimates on the number of existing legacy programs, ranging from “1. Air Force Program Action Directives IssuanceSecretary of the air force. Air Force Program Action Directives AnticipéesCuriously, the Senate report doesn’t note that even if the Air Force was trying to get rid of “only” 1. Air Force’s last failed ERP attempt a few years earlier. The staff report seems to assume that such a business process engineering undertaking was still feasible from the start (and during a period of conflict as well), which is a highly dubious assumption to be making. As I have noted elsewhere, the Do. D CIO at the time claimed to be “closely” monitoring the program, and up to the day ECSS was terminated, the CIO viewed it as being only a moderately risky program. Do. D ERP system developments have been well- documented by the US Government Accountability Office . But Congress has kept the money flowing to them anyway without bothering to perform much in the way of oversight. Predictably, the Senate report avoids looking into Congress's own role in permitting the ECSS failure to occur. In this time of tight government budgets, that list might actually move Congress to quit acting as a disinterested party to their future outcomes. In fact, Federal Computer Week ran an article last week that indicated the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee was slicing $5. Do. D’s IT budget, which is clearly a warning shot across Do. D’s bow. No one has been fired. And, not a single government employee has been held responsible for wasting over $1 billion dollars in taxpayer funds.” The Senators have stated they plan to introduce legislation to hold program managers more accountable in the future.
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